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Forty-one commercial airline pilots executed flight scenarios that varied the time available for deciding
whether and when to divert to an alternate airport. Pilots with the most flight experience were the most
responsive to variance in available decision time: they diverted relatively early when time was short, and later
or not at all when time was plentiful. Greater experience was also associated with efforts to fill gaps in the
available information and test assumptions. A framework is proposed that predicts these effects as a function
of (1) skill at situation recognition and rapid response, (2) metacognitive skill at detecting and handling
uncertainty, and (3) sensitivity to the opportunities to switch between these two skill sets.
Introduction
As a plane streaks towards a landing on a snow-slicked runway, some passengers may hope that the person at the controls
is the lank, grizzled veteran they saw in the cockpit while boarding, not the jaunty young officer sitting beside him. It is easy
to forgive passengers this bias; everyday experience and cognitive research teaches that experience tends to produce expertise.
In domains such as music (Ericsson, Krampe, & Tesch-Romer, 1993), athletics, and chess (Charness, 1995), the best predictor
of skill is the number of hours of deliberate, attentive practice a form of experience that can produce expertise in a decade
(Ericsson, Krampe, & Tesch-Romer, 1993; Chase & Chase, 1973). In commercial air flight, the topic of this paper, Orasanu
(1995) has found that the quality of decision making by airline pilots was positively correlated with years of military aviation
experience and rank with the commercial carrier. 
Skill born of experience is often attributed to the gradual accumulation of meaningful patterns of domain events linked to
appropriate interpretations or responses. Recognition-based models (e.g., Klein, 1989, 1993) leverage empirical evidence of
human skill at pattern-matching. However, they do not account for evidence that decision makers notice and resolve conflicted
matches to multiple patterns, test and refine their understanding when necessary, and construct new knowledge (Schank, 1982;
Pennington and Hastie, 1988). For example, Serfaty (1993) found that experienced Army planners did not perceive more
similarities with prior situations than did less-experienced planners, did not generate plans more rapidly, tended to see the
situation as more complex, were less confident in their solutions, and felt the need for more time. These results are inconsistent
with a simple recognitional model.
The Recognition/Metacognition Framework (Cohen & Freeman, 1996) accounts for a larger range of human decision-
making behaviors than do simple recognition models. The R/M Framework necessarily acknowledges the role of pattern-
matching, or recognitional decision-making. However, it also recognizes an alternative decision-making strategy governed by
metacognitive skill at critiquing and refining situation knowledge. This skill consists in identifying and reducing uncertainty of
three forms: gaps in critical information, unreliable assumptions, and conflicting interpretations of the evidence. These skills
help decision makers to develop more complete and consistent assessments, and these in turn support better decision-making.
Finally, the R/M Framework provides a mechanism (called the Quick Test) for shifting between recognitional and metacognitive
decision-making strategies (Cohen, Parasuraman, & Freeman, in press). This mechanism (1) tests for the presence of uncertainty
that is significant enough that its reduction could potentially change a decision; (2) tests whether a change of decision could
decisively affect the outcome (where the swing in the outcomes defines the stakes); and (3) compares the potential benefits of
reducing uncertainty to the cost of taking time to do so. For example, assume that a helicopter pilot traveling at high speed into
enemy territory unexpectedly glimpses a pair of tanks on the field below. The pilot is uncertain whether the targets are enemy
or friends, a question that greatly influences the outcome of engagement: a successful strike vs. a fratricide. However, taking
the time to examine the tanks by slowing down endangers the pilot and the mission. The pilot determines that the cost of the
delay is low relative to the value of reducing uncertainty to ensure mission success, gathers sensor data that confirms the tanks
are enemies, and destroys them. Thus, the pilot exercises recognition skills, the Quick Test (by considering uncertainty, stakes
and time), and the metacognitive skill of identifying and filling information gaps. 
2Dividing a sample at the median of experience is a conventional method of grouping subjects when no objective index of
expertise exists.
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Accident not yet cleared.Only a single runway is open
at IAD.
Weather at BWI remains below
minimums.
Weather at BWI deteriorates.
Excellent weather, runways
available.
Not available as alternates.
Latest time to divert:
Low-fuel condition: 13:29
High-fuel condition: 13:53
To test the explanatory power of the R/M Framework, we conducted an experiment in which we examined the correlation
of years of experience in a domain with (1) sensitivity to available decision time and (2) metacognitive skill at recognizing and
reducing uncertainty.
Experimental Procedure
A convenience sample of 41 commercial airline pilots executed a flight scenario that required them to decide whether to
divert their commercial jet from its destination at Dulles (IAD). Pilots began the problem by entering a holding pattern near
Dulles (IAD), and then awaited clearance to land through repeated delays. Complicating the decision of whether to divert were
a runway accident at IAD in mid-scenario; severe weather conditions that gradually made it “illegal” under FAA rules to land
at the alternate, BWI; and the potential for traffic backups that might delay landing at the remaining alternate, Norfolk (ORF),
and other airports. Some key information was given to participants in briefing papers, some was announced during the scenario
by the experimenter in the role of Air Traffic Control, some was available during the scenario only upon the pilot’s request (to
Air Traffic Control (ATC), the company dispatcher, or others), and some information (such as remaining flight time, and thus,
the required diversion time) could only be inferred or computed from other information. (See Table 1.)
Table 1.  Scenario events announced to the pilot are in standard type.  Information that pilots had to
infer or request is marked in italic.  EFC = Expected Final Clearance given by ATC.
Time pressure varied between pilots in two versions of the scenario. Twenty-one officers executed a version of this scenario
in which there was sufficient fuel to wait out delays at IAD until well beyond the scenario’s unannounced ending at 36 minutes.
The remaining 20 officers were given sufficient fuel to wait until only the 29 minute mark, at which point they needed to divert
to an alternate in order to land with an adequate backup load of fuel. There was no difference between scenarios except in the
amount of fuel provided.
During data analysis, subjects were segregated into two groups (less experienced pilots vs. more experienced) by dividing
them at the median level of flight experience, 26 years.2 These groups were labeled less experienced and more experienced. In
regression analyses, experience level served as a predictor along with available decision time (low vs. high, represented by
scenario version). Criterion variables were several behavioral indices, including the likelihood and timing of diversion and
requests for maps (or plates) and weather reports.
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Results and Discussion
Sensitivity to time is a central feature of the R/M Framework. Two sets of results pertaining to time were particularly
interesting. First, the timing of pilots’ diversion decisions reflected an interaction of experience with available decision time.
The more experienced officers diverted relatively early when decision time was short, and later when decision time was plentiful
(F1,37 = 4.480, p = 0.041). The diversion times of less experienced pilots were unrelated to available decision time. Furthermore,
when time was plentiful and diversion was unnecessary, more experienced pilots were slightly less likely to divert at all (F1,37 =
3.074, p = 0.088). There are two plausible explanations for these effects. Experience might make pilots more accurate at
estimating time from available fuel, fuel consumption rate, and remaining flight time. This was not the case. Accuracy of time
estimates did not vary reliably with experience. The most plausible alternative explanation is that experience may foster
sensitivity to the need to estimate time and to respect those estimates. While this experiment provides no direct evidence
concerning sensitivity to time, this interpretation is consistent with our findings in interviews with tens of military officers in
situations distinguished by high variance in time stress between high-stakes tasks (Cohen, Freeman, & Thompson, in press;
Freeman & Cohen, 1994).
The second result of interest regarding time concerned how officers used scarce decision time. In the scenario in which
decision time was short, more experienced pilots were less likely than the rest to request approach plates (maps) for ORF (F1,37 =
2.750, p = 0.106). However, when more experienced pilots did request plates for ORF, they did so more promptly after the
critical announcement of a ground accident at IAD than did less experienced officers (F1,4 = 7.149, p = 0.056). This is consistent
with predictions of the R/M Framework that decision makers under time pressure will forego collecting information that will
not change decisions and swing outcomes. In this scenario, most if not all pilots learned from dispatch that ORF was a safe
destination, and even when time was plentiful few pilots requested ORF plates. Clearly, most pilots felt that examining ORF
plates would not change their decisions, and that the information on the plates would come at an unacceptable time-cost.
Experienced pilots who did feel that the ORF data would influence their decisions and the flight outcome made the most of the
available time by requesting ORF plates quite promptly.
The second feature of the R/M Framework that was of interest in this study was metacognitive skill at identifying and
handling sources of uncertainty. In particular, we were interested in effects of experience on the ability to address gaps in the
available information and test assumptions. 
Pilots with greater experience were more likely to detect missing information and quicker to pursue the data they needed.
For example, these pilots were more likely to request information concerning local air traffic which might compete with them
for landing clearances (regardless of available decision time) (t39  = 2.427, p = 0.020). They were more likely and faster to request
detailed approach plates for IAD, though these were not statistically reliable patterns. They also asked about the availabilityof
alternate airports not mentioned in the briefing materials (such as military air bases) earlier when time was scarce, and later whe
it was plentiful, while less experienced pilots exhibited the reverse pattern (F1,10 = 2.892, p = 0.120). We interpret these data as
evidence that more experienced pilots had a superior ability to locate gaps in their knowledge and to request information in a
more timely manner.
Pilots with more experience were more likely or faster to test assumptions about the reliability of potentially dynamic data
than were other pilots. Announcing a runway accident at IAD, ATC gave a suspiciously short estimate (13 minutes) of the time
required to clear the runway and issue further clearances. Pilots with more experience more promptly requested updated estimates
of expected clearance (t20 = -3.186, p = 0.005). (The likelihood of such requests did not vary with experience). More-
experienced pilots were also more likely to request updates to weather reports concerning IAD, a wise precaution given the
rapidity with which the storm front eventually closed BWI as a legal alternate. We interpret these patterns of behavior as
evidence that more experienced officers examined their understanding for weak assumptions concerning potentially dynamic
forces, and tested those assumptions with explicit queries for information.
In sum, the experiment provided evidence that individuals with more experience were more cognizant of available decision
time, and that this sensitivity influenced both their information gathering efforts and their decisions. In addition, the data
demonstrate that greater experience is associated with skill at identifying and addressing sources of uncertainty in situation
understanding, particularly gaps and assumptions. These are key elements of the Recognition/Metacognition Framework. Thus,
the research validates components of the framework, indicating its promise as a tool for understanding decision-making under
time pressure.
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